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ABSTRACT: The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions was adopted in 1997. During the last ten years the 
OECD has been extremely busy monitoring the implementation of this Convention in 
contracting states. During this process a number of issues have emerged. This article 
examines some of these: (1) the role and impact of the functional equivalence approach, (2) 
the effect of gaps and flexibility surrounding international business transactions and 
corporate liability, and (3) Article 5 and the defence of necessity available to a State under 
customary international law in the context of the UK decision to end the BAE investigations.
INTRODUCTION
The recent push from the World Bank (WB)1 and the work of Transparency International 
(TI), 2  together with increasing media coverage, has brought public and policymakers’ 
attention to the high incidence of corruption,3 be it corruption on a small scale or a grand scale, 
? Indira Carr is Professor of Law, University of Surrey; Honorary Professor, University of Exeter. She 
wishes to thank the Arts & Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for their research grant to fund the 
project entitled ‘Corruption in International Business: Limitations of Law’. 
Opi Outhwaite is AHRC funded Researcher on the above project, University of Surrey. 
1 For more on this institution visit <http://www.wb.org>. 
2 TI publishes a Corruption Perception Index, based on surveys where information is provided by 
country experts. More information on TI and their corruption indices are available at 
<http://www.transparency.org>. 
3  Corruption and its detection should by no means be viewed as a modern day problem. It was 
recognised as a problem among public officials in the ancient world too. For instance, an Indian writer 
on statecraft by the name of Kautilya (c. 250 BCE) in his Arthashastra states: 
 Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or the poison that finds itself at the tip of 
the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the 
king's revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as 
drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in the government work 
cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves)… 
Shamasastry, R.(trs) Book II Ch IX (2nd ed. Wesleyan Mission Press: Mysore, 1923) 
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in both developed and developing countries. While there is no doubt that petty corruption in 
the form of bribes to obtain services such as a passport or a driving licence from government 
officials is prevalent in many developing countries and injurious to trust in the government 
and the rule of law, it is corruption at the grand level in the form of bribes by businesses to 
domestic and foreign public officials that is seen as causing the greatest harm to a country in 
terms of economic growth and high levels of poverty. There are numerous studies from the 
WB and others that exhibit in economic terms this close link. 4  With international 
organisations and developed countries taking on the mandate of reducing poverty it should 
come as no surprise that they have turned their attention to reforming corruption laws globally 
to ensure an enabling environment for trade to flourish thus contributing to economic growth 
and stability. Despite the positive impact of international trade on growth it also has the 
potential to raise serious issues in a variety of contexts, such as the means through which a 
business organisation has obtained a contract or the subject matter of the contract intended for 
export or import, that cut across national security, state relations and principles such as those 
of international law. Some of these issues could impact on the very foundations of life itself 
as for instance where the illegal behaviour of a business organisation from State A operating 
in State B threatens the supply of essential goods such as oil and food from State B to State A. 
There is always the danger of head on clashes between states seeking to protect their own, 
differing, rights and interests and against this backdrop the idea of the ‘public interest’ 
becomes a very confusing one. 
The task of drafting a legal framework in the form of anti-corruption conventions to 
bring about some level of harmonisation was undertaken by both regional and international 
4 See Alatas, S. Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions (Avebury: Aldershot, 1990); Bergsten, F. 
& K. Elliott (eds) Corruption in the World Economy (World Bank: Washington, 1997); HMSO 
Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (Cmnd 5006, HMSO: London, 
2000); Rose-Ackermann, S. ‘The Economics of Corruption’ (1975)  Journal of Public Economics, 4(2): 
187-203; Gray, C. W. & D. Kaufmann ‘Corruption and Development’ (1998) Finance and 
Development, 35(1): 7-16; Tanzi, V. ‘Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and 
Cures’ (1998) IMF Staff Papers WP/98/63: 1-39. Corruption may also have something positive to 
contribute. For instance, in a highly bureaucratic state corruption may speed up the mechanism for 
economic development. On the positive aspects of corruption see Heidenheimer, A., M. Johnston & V. 
Le Vine (eds), Political Corruption: A Handbook (Transaction Books: New Brunswick , 1989). 
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organisations and this has seen the adoption of a number of conventions, many of which are 
in force.5 One of the institutions to adopt an anti-corruption convention early on was the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Deemed a successful 
convention in terms of the numbers of ratification it has received (37 as of January 2008),6 it 
is now ten years since the adoption of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention). Since 
the OECD has been busy monitoring the implementation of the convention by the contracting 
states during this period it is an opportune moment to reflect on some of the provisions of the 
convention which raise doubts about their applicability or the level of harmonisation that they 
can achieve.  
This article is by no means an article-by-article analysis. As and where relevant the 
United Kingdom (UK) is used as an illustration since it has received numerous 
recommendations from the OECD and has also faced intense criticism from the media, the 
OECD and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in light of the recent decision to drop 
the investigation into the British Aerospace (BAE) slush fund allegations discussed later. 
5 The conventions in force are: 
 1) Organisation of American States Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 
1996 (OAS Convention). Entered into force on 6 March 1997 
 2) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1997 
(OECD Convention). Entered into force on 15 February 1999.  
 3) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 (COE 
Convention). Entered into force on 1 July 2002.  
 4) African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 2003 (AU 
Convention). Entered into force on 5 August 2006. See Carr, I ‘Corruption in Africa: is the 
African Union Convention on Combating Corruption the Answer?’ 2007 The Journal of 
Business Law March: 111-136. For a comparison of the three African conventions see Carr, I. 
‘Africa Fights Corruption: An Account of the Three African Conventions’ (forthcoming). 
 5) United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 (UN Convention). Entered 
into force on 14 December 2005. See Carr, I. ‘The United Nations Convention on Corruption: 
Improving the Quality of Life of Millions in the World’ (2006) Manchester Journal of 
International Economic Law 3(3): 3-44. 
6 Ratifications or accessions have come from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
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Section I deals with the historical background to place the OECD Convention against 
the wider context of global anti-corruption developments and highlights the approach taken 
by this instrument to achieve effective harmonisation and implementation through a mix of 
the functional equivalence approach and monitoring. Section II focuses on two main issues: (1) 
the effect of gaps and flexibility surrounding the provisions on international business 
transactions and the liability of corporations, and (2) the impact of functional equivalence in 
practice. Section III examines Art 5 in the context of the UK decision to end the BAE 
investigation on grounds of national security and explores whether necessity, under customary 
international law, could provide a defence where essential interests such as national security 
are at stake.  
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The prime mover for the OECD to take steps to combat corruption of foreign public officials 
was pressure applied by the United States (US), which took almost two decades to bring about 
the intended result. The US passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977. It 
came into existence in the wake of the Lockheed scandal7 and a report from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1976.8  This report revealed that questionable or illegal 
payments to foreign officials and foreign politicians were a widespread phenomenon in the 
US corporate sector and included companies from the chemical, aerospace, pharmaceuticals 
and oil and gas sectors.  
Any attempt to lower standards of business engagement by adopting corrupt practices 
of course has a negative impact not only on the company itself but on other companies within 
that state and on the state itself, including substantially lowering market integrity. As the 
7 The US company, Lockheed, had made illegal payments to government officials in various countries 
(including Japan, Netherlands, Italy) to secure contracts for the sale of aeroplanes. The Lockheed 
scandal in Japan resulted in the prosecution of various officials including Kakuei Tanaka (Prime 
Minister in office from 1972-74). In the Netherlands Prince Bernhardt resigned when inquiries into 
allegations that he had received $1 million from Lockheed were initiated. For more on this see 
Markovits, A. S. & M. Silverstein The Politics of Scandal (Holmes & Meier: New York, 1988); 
Mitchell, R. H. Political Bribery in Japan (University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 1996). 
8 Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on 
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (1976). 
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report to the House of Representative makes clear such activities ‘cast a shadow on all US 
companies. The exposure … can damage a company’s image, lead to costly lawsuits, cause 
the cancellation of contracts, and result in the appropriation of valuable assets overseas.’9
Alongside are the problems that the state itself faces in its relations with friendly countries 
and its image in foreign countries. These reasons coupled with the unfolding allegation of 
payments by Lockheed across many countries were sufficiently persuasive to lead to the 
enactment of the FCPA.  
The US recognised that bribery of foreign public officials was not simply a US 
problem but a universal one. In aggressively promoting the adoption of similar legislation in 
other industrialised countries the US sought to ensure a level playing field for competing 
businesses and to increase market integrity and stability. The FCPA is legislation that has 
economic interests at its heart. It took until 1997 for the US pressure to bear fruit and that 
came in the form of the OECD Convention. 
Though it is not the intention here to provide an article-by-article analysis of the 
OECD Convention, a brief outline of the OECD Convention is necessary. Some of these areas 
will be considered in more detail in later sections. In brief the Convention requires State 
Parties to:
(a) Criminalise bribery on the supply side (active bribery) of a foreign public 
official in international business transactions,10 with “foreign public official” 
widely defined to include different types of public officials including those 
working in international organisations;11
(b)Establish liability of legal persons in accordance with the State’s legal 
principles;12
(c) Take measures with regard to accounting practices so that off-the-books 
records and similar practices are prohibited;13
9 House of Representative, 95th Congress 1st Session, Report No 95-640. 
10 Art I (1); Paras 3-10: Commentaries. 
11 Art I(4); Paras 12-19: Commentaries 
12 Art 2; Para 20: Commentaries. 
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(d)Make bribery of foreign public officials an extraditable offence;14
(e) Make bribery of a foreign public official a predicate offence for the application 
of money laundering legislation on the same terms; and  
(f) Provide mutual legal assistance.15
It should be noted that the monitoring system adopted in the OECD Convention is one 
of its unique features.16 The peer-review nature of the system in particular implies a high level 
of rigour. The process consists of two phases and is conducted by the OECD Working Group 
on Bribery in International Business Transactions (WG). Phase 1 assesses the extent of 
conformity of a State Party’s anti-bribery laws with the OECD Convention and Phase 2 
assesses the state of the operation and enforcement of relevant national provisions. This 
involves a one week long on-site visit by the WG during which it meets with actors from a 
variety of backgrounds – the government, trade councils, development agencies, businesses, 
and civil society. Phase 2 reports are extremely detailed and indicate an exhaustive 
examination of the implementation of the OECD Convention through amendments to the 
national legislation, analysis of statistical data gathered by criminal agencies, the level of 
public awareness, details about sanctions, questions of jurisdiction and levels of international 
co-operation.  
The approach taken to determine compliance of State Parties’ legal frameworks with 
the OECD Convention is one of ‘functional equivalence’.17 According to the Commentaries 
13 Art 8: Para 29: Commentaries. 
14 Art 10: Para 33: Commentaries. 
15 Art 9: Para 30 - 32: Commentaries. 
16 According to Art 12 the Parties are required to co-operate in ‘carrying out a programme of systematic 
follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation’ of [the OECD Convention] and this is to be 
done in the ‘framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions …’ See also Commentaries, paras 34-36. 
17  The functional equivalence method is not new to the OECD Convention. For instance, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce also adopts a functional equivalence approach. Its 
focus however is achieving equivalence across two different mediums through an examination of the 
functions and purposes of a paper-based environment with a view to seeing how those functions could 
be fulfilled in a digital environment. The Guide to the Enactment of the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce in paras 15-18 states: 
 [A]mong the functions served by a paper document are the following: to provide that 
a document would be legible by all; to provide that a document would remain unaltered over 
time, to allow for the authentication of data by means of a signature; and to provide that a 
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the OECD expects the ‘Parties to sanction bribery of foreign public officials, without 
requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a Party’s legal system’. 18
Functional equivalence is a method commonly used in comparative law and traceable to the 
works of René David and Ernst Rabel.19 Despite the seeming diversity of interpretations20 of 
this method of analysis in comparative law there seems to be a common focus on whether 
there are equivalents in the legal systems that function in a manner so as to achieve a similar 
result. The comparativist therefore focuses on the effects rather than on the rules and in so 
doing studies the interrelationships between different areas of law, the relationship between 
law and procedure and the dynamics between law, society and culture. Though the OECD 
Commentaries do not give much by way of elucidation, the writings of Mark Pieth (Chairman 
of the WG) indicate that ‘functional equivalence’ in the OECD is to be construed along 
similar lines. In ‘Taking Stock: Making the OECD Initiative against Corruption’ he states: 
The Convention borrows a principle developed in comparative law and further develops it. 
According to the functional approach of comparison attention is drawn to the overall 
working of systems rather than individual institutions. The assumption is that each legal 
system has its own logic and is not necessarily determined by the legal texts alone. Practices 
and informal rules are part of this approach as well as other aspects of the legal system taking 
document would be in a form acceptable to public authorities and courts … in respect of all 
the above-mentioned functions of a paper, electronic record can provide the same level of 
security as paper … 
 In adopting a functionally equivalent approach as the UNCITRAL notes it is 
important to ensure that the standards for both mediums are equivalent. 
‘Functional equivalence’ is also a method used in other disciplines such as linguistics and translation 
studies. 
18 Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in International 
Business transactions, Doc. Ref. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20. 
19 David, R. & J. Brierley Major Legal Systems of the World Today (trs Breierley, J 3rd ed. Stevens & 
Sons: London, 1985); Rheinstein, M. ‘In Memory of Ernst Rabel’ (1956) American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 5(2): 185-196. See also Kahn-Freund, O. ‘Comparative Law as an Academic 
Subject’ (1966) Law Quarterly Review, 82: 40-61; Reitz, J. C. ‘How to Do Comparative law’ (1998) 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 46(4): 617-636. 
20 For instance functional equivalence is also meant to play an evaluative role in assessing which law 
performs better in meeting its goals.  
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over ancillary functions. Therefore the focus of comparison would lie on overall effects 
produced by a country’s legal system rather than the individual rules.21
It is not entirely clear how this principle has been developed further by the OECD since the 
explanation of the principle reflects the general understanding of this principle prevalent 
amongst comparative lawyers but it becomes important, for example, in respect of assessing 
the impact of the functional equivalence approach in practice in the monitoring of a State 
Party’s compliance with the OECD Convention.  
Of course, in promoting functional equivalence it is expected that a contracting state 
does not treat cases of foreign bribery more stringently than domestic bribery. For instance 
when it comes to sanctions or burden of proof the standards between foreign bribery and 
domestic bribery should be the same. This expectation of parity is reflected in Art 3(1) when 
it states that the ‘range of penalties for the bribery of a foreign public official shall be 
comparable to that applicable to the bribery of the public officials’. 
Besides a general statement in respect of functional equivalence in the Commentaries, 
the adoption of this approach is also reflected in other ways such as the introduction of an 
element of flexibility within the provision itself, for instance in Art 3(3),22 and an indication 
of the level of tolerance to various approaches in the Commentaries to the Convention as for 
instance in respect of Art 1.23
21 Available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/pieth2000.htm>. Emphasis in original.  
22 It states: 
 Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to provide that the bribe 
and the proceeds of the bribery of a foreign public official, or property the value of which 
corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and confiscation or that monetary 
sanctions of comparable effect are applicable. 
23 Para 3 of the Commentaries elucidates further the offence created by Art 1 thus: 
 Article 1 establishes a standard to be met by Parties, but does not require them to 
utilise its precise terms in defining the offence under their domestic laws. A Party may use 
various approaches to fulfil its obligations, provided that conviction of a person for the 
offence does not require proof of elements beyond those which would be required to be 
proved if the offence were defined as in this paragraph. For example, a statute prohibiting the 
bribery of agents generally which does not specifically address bribery of a foreign public 
official, and a statute specifically limited to this case, could both comply with this Article. 
Similarly, a statute which defined the offence in terms of payments “to induce a breach of the 
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II. GAPS, FLEXIBILITY AND FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE IN PRACTICE
This section explores (1) the gaps and flexibility within provisions with a view to addressing 
the issue of clarity and harmonisation and (2) the use of the functional equivalence approach 
in practice. For these purposes sub-sections II.1 and II.2, below, consider the lack of a 
definition of ‘international business transactions’ and the uncertainties surrounding corporate 
liability. Sub-section II.3 explores whether functional equivalence plays a significant role in 
assessing a country’s implementation of the OECD Convention by considering the UK’s 
extension of the bribery offence to apply to ‘foreign public officials’ against the Phase I, 
Phase I bis and Phase 2 Reports of the WG. 
II.1. International Business Transactions 
As made apparent by its title, the focus of the OECD Convention is ‘international business 
transactions’. It would be normal to expect a definition of the phrase. No doubt the drafters 
may have felt that such a well worn phrase was sufficiently clear so as not to require a 
definition within the Convention. The potential danger that it may be read restrictively as 
referring to the sale of goods and services where the parties are located in two different states 
is displaced in the opening paragraph of the preamble which indicates that international 
business transactions include trade and investment.24 This wider approach means that the 
OECD Convention will apply to all types of international commercial arrangements such as 
technology transfer, franchise agreements and manufacture of goods under licence.  
While there is no doubt that a core of transactions fall squarely within this phrase 
there are some that fall within the penumbra of uncertainty. The provision of higher education 
official’s duty” could meet the standard provided that it was understood that every public 
official had a duty to exercise judgement or discretion impartially and this was an 
“autonomous” definition not requiring proof of the law of the particular official’s country. 
24 It reads: 
 Considering that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business 
transactions, including trade and investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns, 
undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts international 
competitive conditions … 
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across borders provides an illustration. Education, often, and rightly, regarded as a public 
good provided by the State, has undergone massive changes since the infusion of neo-liberal 
policies into education since the 1980s. The gradual introduction of fees and institutional 
reliance on sources of funding other than the government seems to have shifted higher 
education in particular from the public to the commercial realm. Universities are increasingly 
viewed as business institutions with export potential and subject to market forces.25 Seen as a 
major industry in its own right with the potential for substantial economic impact many higher 
education establishments from developed countries, Australia and the United Kingdom for 
instance, have set up off-shore campuses or have entered into contracts with foreign agents 
for the recruitment of students from that country. Educational institutions in most countries 
require government licences. The qualifications to be awarded by the institutions also need 
government recognition and, where relevant, recognition by professional bodies such as 
associations for chartered accountants, engineers, computer scientists and lawyers. The 
issuing of licences or permits and recognition of qualifications is usually channelled though 
the Ministry of Education and professional bodies (e.g. the Bar Association) thus providing 
opportunities for corruption. The issue of course is whether the offer of a bribe to X (bribe 
taker), a public official in the Ministry of Education in Country B, by Y (bribe giver), a 
representative from the University of Poppleton in Country A, is caught by the OECD 
Convention. That will depend on how the provision of education and the cross border 
arrangements are viewed.  
In providing higher education in foreign countries an institution is operating like a 
business enterprise and offering a service that is no different from a company selling a service. 
This approach to education as a commodity is supported by the World Trade Organisation’s 
(WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).26 According to Art I (3) (a) – (b):  
25 See, for example, Ziguras, C., G. McBurnie & L. Reinke ‘Hardly Neutral Players: Australia’s Role in 
Liberalising Trade in Education Sevices’ (2003) Globalisation Societies and Education, 1(3): 359-374; 
Harman, G. ‘New Directions in Internationalising Higher Education in Australia’ (2004) Higher 
Education Policy, 17(1): 101-120; Pick, D. ‘The Re-framing of Australian Higher Education’ (2006) 
Higher Education Quarterly, 60(3): 229-241. 
26 It entered into force in January 1995. The purpose of GATS is no different from that of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It is intended to contribute to ‘trade expansion under 
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the economic 
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(a) “services” includes any services in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority.  
(b)  “a service is supplied in the exercise of governmental authority” means any service which 
is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service 
suppliers.27
The major changes to education provision in many countries seems to have resulted in a shift 
where education is viewed (rightly or wrongly) as an industry in its own right competing in 
the market with other education providers28  suggesting that education should fall within 
international business transactions and would therefore be within the OECD Convention’s 
ambit. This argument becomes even stronger as states license commercial profit making 
organisations to award degrees and other qualifications, but others have taken a different 
view.29 It must be noted that the issue of corruption in education is a subject that has not been 
closely studied but there are indications from various surveys in third world countries30 that 
corruption within the education sector is not unknown.  
growth of all trading partners and the development of developing countries.’ It lists within it 12 core 
sectors which include educational services. ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services: An 
Introduction’ (29 March 2006 (3776.4)) available at http://www.wto.org, (WTO, Doc. 
MTN.GNS/W/120).  
27 The examples cited by the WTO in relation to Arts 1(3)(a) – (b) are police, fire protection, 
mandatory social security, tax and customs administration and monetary policy operations. 
28 According to Suave, P. Trade, Education and the Gats: What’s In, What’s Out, What’s all the Fuss 
About (OECD: Paris, 2001): 
 [T]he market for trade in education services is big, diverse and innovative and 
growing fast. It will almost certainly continue to grow as societies place a premium in human 
capital enhancement as a source of development and a means of equipping individuals and 
societies to confront, adjust to and take advantage of the demands arising from closer 
economic integration. (p. 4)  
29 The inclusion of education within an instrument that focuses on trade speak is, of course, highly 
debatable and this inclusion has been questioned both from value and human rights perspective. See 
Tamosevski, K., Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (United Nations: 
New York, 2002). See also Sinclair, S. GATS: How the World Trading Organisation’s New ‘Services’ 
Threaten Democracy (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: Ottawa, 2000); Knight, J. GATS, Trade 
and Higher Education Perspective 2003: Where are We? (The Observatory on Borderless Higher 
Education: London, 2003). 
30 Transparency International – Kenya, Corruption in Kenya: Findings of an Urban Bribery Survey
(2001), available at http://www.transparency.org; The United Republic of Tanzania Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption, Report on the Commission on Corruption, (President’s 
Office: Dar es Salaam, 1996). 
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As the above discussion indicates, the phrase ‘international business transactions’ is 
likely to take on new hues as a result of liberalisation and changing perceptions and attitudes 
towards State provided basic services such as education and health. Maybe it is as well that 
the OECD Convention did not include a definition of the phrase but the lack of clarity 
resulting from the absence of a definition could also be a serious hindrance to harmonisation 
since it leaves room for a variety of interpretations when a particular sector’s inclusion or 
non-inclusion falls within the penumbra of uncertainty. One way to address this lack of clarity 
would have been to elucidate on the phrase in the Commentaries, for example, by reference to 
what the international mercantile community regards as business transactions and 
developments in WTO law for the purposes of interpretation.
II.2 Corporate Liability 
The OECD Convention in Art 2 requires a State Party to ‘take measures as may be necessary, 
in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery 
of a foreign public official’. The State Party is not required under the Convention to establish 
criminal liability of legal persons if that is not possible under its legal system according to 
Para 20 of the Commentaries. The expectation however seems to be that the State will have 
some form of alternative non-criminal liability such as civil or administrative liability31 in 
place.
Establishing fault on the part of a company however is complex since jurisdictions 
vary in their approach. Even amongst common law jurisdictions there is no uniformity of 
approach. Initially common law employed vicarious liability derived from the law of tort. The 
reasoning behind this approach was that the master was responsible for the acts of his servant 
while carrying out the business of the master. Vicarious liability however could not be utilised 
in the context of criminal offences since most of these offences required a state of mind. Since 
companies are non-natural persons with no mind or body attributing fault to companies was 
31 See Phase 2 Report, Germany, pp 28-32. 
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difficult until the case of Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co 32 which
formulated the ‘directing mind’ principle in holding that the fault of the director involved in 
the operation of the company was the fault of the company. According to Viscount Haldane, 
A corporation … has no mind of its own any more than it has body of its own; its active and 
directing will must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who for some purposes 
may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the 
very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation.33
The identification of the acts and states of mind of officers within a company with that of the 
company has been adopted in most common law countries though in some, such as the UK, it 
is applied narrowly to officers higher up the command chain. For instance, in Tesco
Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass34 it was held by the House of Lords that a manager of one of the 
Tesco supermarkets where goods were sold at a price higher than that advertised at that 
branch was not a directing mind.  
Other jurisdictions, such as Canada, that have adopted this approach to finding 
corporate fault seem more ready to find the directing mind further down the command chain35
and this seems to be the more sensible route. The UK approach in looking for the directing 
mind at higher levels of management is a centralised one and is unsuited to current day 
operational procedures of companies since they are diffused geographically and 
functionally. 36  Since the current approach is dependant on the identification of that one 
individual within a company it does not allow for the aggregation of the mental states of more 
than one person within the organisation.37
As opposed to the directing mind approach the US provides a better alternative. It 
does not focus on the mental element and makes a company criminally liable for the acts of 
32 [1915] AC 705. 
33 At 713. 
34 [1972] AC 153. 
35 See the Canadian case Canadian Dredge & Dock Ltd v The Queen (1985) 19 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC); 
Hanna, D. ‘Corporate Criminal Liability’ (1988-89) Criminal Law Quarterly, 31: 452-470. 
36 Wells, C. Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1993) 
37 R v P & O European Ferries Ltd [1990] 93 Cr App Rep, 72.  
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its personnel, be they directors, officers or other employees, if they act within their scope and 
for the benefit of the company.38
Given the many approaches to imputing fault on the part of a company it is 
unfortunate that the OECD has not put forward an autonomous provision to address this issue. 
Lack of such a provision means a variety of jurisdiction-dependant approaches thus resulting 
in non-homogeneity. If any headway is to be made in the fight against corruption 
harmonisation remains a vital ingredient.  
It seems, however, that the OECD might be addressing this lack of uniformity 
through its monitoring system. With respect to the UK, the Phase 2 Report highlights 
difficulties within the current common law approach to criminal liability39 and this is revisited 
in the context of measures taken by the UK in export credit and the implementation of the 
European Union Procurement Directive in its Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of the 
Phase 2 Recommendation adopted in June 2007. It states:
Policies excluding convicted companies from access to public benefits such as export credit or 
development aid moneys can only be effective if companies can be convicted of bribery in the 
first place. Conviction of a company for a foreign bribery was not a realistic possibility under 
applicable UK case law at the time of the Phase 2 Report and the law remains unchanged. 
Accordingly, while the UK has taken action since the Phase 2 Report in implementing an 
European Union procurement directive regarding sanctions on convicted companies, the 
Working Group doubts that they will be useful with regard to UK companies that engage in 
bribery until the law on the liability of legal persons (companies) for foreign bribery is 
modified.  
The Law Commission recently published a Consultation Document Reforming 
Bribery. 40  Unfortunately, it has not addressed the issue of corporate liability leaving the 
38 See Phase 2 Report, US, p. 7. 
39 Phase 2 Report, UK, p. 64.  
40 Law Commission Consultation Paper 185 (2007). 
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matter to a wider review of corporate liability. State parties need to respond constructively to 
OECD recommendations if homogeneity is to be achieved. 
II.3. Bribery, Foreign Public Officials and Functional Equivalence 
The difficulty in defining ‘corruption’ in generic terms is well rehearsed and the variety of 
approaches taken by the different anti-corruption conventions is indicative of this.41 Bribery42
is widely understood to be the commonest form of corruption and the OECD makes this its 
focus. In its simplest form it involves a minimum of two actors, the bribe taker (X) and the 
bribe giver (Y), and envisages a contemporaneous or a near contemporaneous exchange of 
money for a favour, be it an act or an omission, as for instance where X accepts money from 
Y to provide information about other bidders or to destroy an application for an export licence 
from Y’s competitor. Not all cases of bribery are so straightforward. The giving and the 
41 Instances of behaviour (not all involving mutual exchange) we normally tend to perceive as corrupt 
include:  
Patronage – bestowal of a benefit to an individual, individuals or a group by virtue of 
a relationship regardless of merit. In agrarian societies this may involve the bestowal of a 
cottage by a landlord to a peasant. In more complex circumstances this may involve benefits 
for instance to a relative, a friend, members of a group, a club, a school, caste or religious 
faction; 
Bribery – where there is an immediate or delayed mutual exchange of a benefit in 
return for a benefit be it monetary or otherwise; 
Misappropriation – illegal appropriation of funds for private use; 
Disloyalty – illegal use of confidential/sensitive information; 
Societal corruption – behaviour that is morally questionable;  
Lack of civic virtue – behaviour that is totally motivated by self-interestedness and 
total disregard of the common good; and 
Decay of political order. 
See Carr, I. ‘Fighting Corruption through Regional and International Conventions: A Satisfactory 
Solution?’ (2007) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 15(2): 121-154. 
42 In some countries a distinction is drawn between ‘bribes’ and ‘facilitation payments’. In such cases 
the latter, likened to tips, continue to be provided by MNCs who explain them away as conforming to 
local practices and a way of doing business by following the local norms. (see Bayart, J. F. The State in 
Africa: The Politics of the Belly (Longman: London, 1993)) The distinction between bribes and 
facilitation payments is indeed very thin but it is difficult to see how the latter can be justified as a legal 
payment especially if the payment is a large one. Calling a ‘bribe’ a ‘facilitation payment’ does not in 
any way change the nature of the act. The distinction depends on the value of the facilitation payments 
and the expectations arising from those payments. Facilitation payments are often likened to the 
practice of gift-giving in China. As to whether the gift is bribery or not depends on the value of the gift. 
For an interesting discussion of gift-giving in China see Tian, Q. A Transcultural Study of Ethical 
Perceptions and Judgments between Chinese and German Business Managers (Martin Meidenbuaer 
Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH & Co KG: Muenchen, 2004). The OECD Convention in its 
Commentaries (para 9) states that ‘small “facilitation” payments do not constitute payments made to 
“obtain or retain business or other improper advantage” within the meaning of paragraph 1’. 
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receiving agreed between X and Y may be spread over time. Also both X and Y may have 
distanced themselves from direct contact in order to minimise the risk of leaving a trail (an 
important element for successful investigation) by introducing a number of agents for the 
purposes of communication and transference of benefits. X may require that Y give the 
benefits to third party beneficiaries, such as a relative or a friend of X. 43 It is also possible 
that benefits besides money may be offered, for example gifts of various kinds such as 
expensive holidays, houses or sexual favours.44
In creating the offence of bribery of foreign public officials in Art 1(1) the OECD 
Convention addresses all of the above and more by going beyond the act of giving promises 
and offers.45 Since bribery of a foreign public official is the focus of this Convention this 
phrase is defined in Art 1(4)46 and paras 12-19 of the Commentaries.  
Given the strong indication that functional equivalence is a core principle on which 
the OECD Convention is founded it would follow that in adopting compatible measures a 
State Party is not necessarily expected to adopt the same form of words as the Convention, or 
even to follow the form of the provisions closely, as long as the measures that are introduced 
give effect – are functionally equivalent – to those provisions. Neither does the Convention 
require that the implementing state enact a specific instrument on anti-corruption. So it would 
43 For an interesting account of the number of people involved in corrupt deals see Attorney General of 
Zambia for and on behalf of the Republic of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai (a firm) and Ors [2007] 
EWHC 952 (Ch).
44 See The United Republic of Tanzania, Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption, 
Report on the Commission on Corruption, (President’s Office: Dar es Salaam, 1996); The Sunday 
Times, April 1 2007.   
45 Art I(1) states: 
 Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a 
criminal offence for any person to intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary 
advantage or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public 
official, for that official or a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other 
improper advantage in the conduct of international business. 
46 Art 1(4)(a) states: 
 “foreign public official” means any person holding a legislative, administrative or 
judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a 
public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and 
any official or agent of a public international organization. 
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be perfectly acceptable for a State to have its anti-corruption legislation spread across a 
number of legal sources if its legal system allows it.  
The case of the UK provides an interesting illustration in this context. At the time of 
ratification its anti-corruption laws were to be found in common law, in the Public Bodies 
Corrupt Act 1889, and in the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 as amended by the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916. The WG carried out Phase 1 monitoring in December 
1999 that resulted in the communication of various concerns in respect of Art 1,47 among 
them the lack of clarity as to whether existing provisions on bribery extended to foreign 
public officials. This saw the inclusion of Part 12 (ss 108 – 110) in the Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA)48 which introduced a foreign element into the common law 
47  See OECD, ‘United Kingdom: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 
Recommendation’ pp 24-26 available at <http://www.oecd.org >. 
48 This Act came into force on February 14, 2002. Ss. 108 and 109 read:  
108. Bribery and corruption: foreign officers etc.  
(1) For the purposes of any common law offence of bribery it is immaterial if the 
functions of the person who receives or is offered a reward have no connection with 
the United Kingdom and are carried out in a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom.  
(2) In section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (c. 34) (corrupt transactions 
with agents) insert this subsection after subsection (3)—  
     “(4) For the purposes of this Act it is immaterial if—  
 (a) the principal’s affairs or business have no connection with the United 
Kingdom and are conducted in a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom;  
 (b) the agent’s functions have no connection with the United Kingdom and 
are carried out in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.” 
(3) In section 7 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 (c. 69) (interpretation 
relating to corruption in office) in the definition of “public body” for “but does not 
include any public body as above defined existing elsewhere than in the United 
Kingdom” substitute “and includes any body which exists in a country or territory 
outside the United Kingdom and is equivalent to any body described above”.  
(4) In section 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 (c. 64) (in the 1889 and 1916 
Acts public body includes local and public authorities of all descriptions) after 
“descriptions” insert “(including authorities existing in a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom)”.  
              109. Bribery and corruption committed outside the UK 
              (1) This section applies if—  
(a) a national of the United Kingdom or a body incorporated under the law of any 
part of the United Kingdom does anything in a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom, and  
(b) the act would, if done in the United Kingdom, constitute a corruption offence (as 
defined below).  
 (2) In such a case—  
        (a) the act constitutes the offence concerned, and  
        (b) proceedings for the offence may be taken in the United Kingdom.  
 (3) These are corruption offences—  
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offence of bribery and the existing statutes on corruption through a territorial extension. 
Section 108(3) ATCSA amends s.7 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Act to include public bodies 
in territories outside the UK. In introducing the foreign element in this way, the UK felt that it 
had met the standards set by Art 1 of the OECD Convention.  
Regardless, the WG retained its concerns in respect of the way in which the UK had 
extended the bribery offence to apply to foreign public officials. Its concerns stemmed from 
the fact that an autonomous definition of ‘foreign public official’ had not been adopted. For 
instance in its Phase 1 Bis Report with regard to the definition of bribery of foreign public 
official the WG stated: 
Article 1(4) of the Convention gives an autonomous definition of foreign public officials to 
which national legislation should conform as closely as possible. In defining a foreign public 
official, the U.K.’s new legislation preserves the terminology employed in the domestic 
context. In essence, the definitions of “agent”, “principal”, “public office” and “public 
authorities” from which the concept of “public official” must be derived, are simply 
transposed by territorial extension so that they must now respectively be interpreted in a 
“foreign” context in the light of the expanded scope of the offence. The Working Group 
considers that such an approach may make a homogenous application of the Convention 
among the Parties more difficult. 49
This concern continues since in Phase 2 it recommended that bribery of foreign public 
officials be specifically addressed. It must be noted that other concerns were also raised in 
        (a) any common law offence of bribery;   
(b) the offences under section 1 of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 (c.   
69) (corruption in office);  
(c) the first two offences under section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (c. 
34) (bribes obtained by or given to agents).  
 (4) A national of the United Kingdom is an individual who is—  
(a) a British citizen, a British Dependent Territories citizen, a British National 
(Overseas) or a British Overseas citizen,  
        (b) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 (c. 61) is a British subject, or  
        (c) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act.  
49 p. 17. 
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respect of whether UK law50 complied with the standards set down in Art 1, as in the manner 
of committing the bribery offence since UK law does not specifically mention promise51 and 
the use of intermediaries.52
The response of the WG in respect of the UK anti-corruption law’s compliance with 
the OECD Convention does raise the question of whether functional equivalence plays any 
role at all in practice. The WG’s insistence that a State Party follow the form of the OECD 
Convention closely strongly suggests that its impact, if any, is minimal. This is made apparent 
in the WG’s response in its assessment of the UK’s approach to defining the offence of 
bribery even though the Commentaries to Art 1 indicate that some degree of tolerance in the 
way a State goes about in meeting the set standards is assumed. The above suggestion in 
respect of the impact becomes stronger when the WG’s dissatisfaction generally with the UK 
legal framework due to its ‘complexity and uncertainty’53 and its strong recommendation to 
adopt a single anti-corruption instrument is taken on board. If functional equivalence had been 
taken into account seriously the WG would not have raised the point with regard to 
complexity and uncertainty since it would have appreciated that each ‘legal system has its 
50 Besides the legislative developments taken to implement the OECD Convention, in 2003 the UK 
Government published its Draft Corruption Bill (Cm 5777) following the model proposed by the Law 
Commission in its Report Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption of 1998 (Law Com No 248.) The 
Bill was not enacted due to widespread criticism of lack of clarity and complexity. The Law 
Commission, at the request of the Home Office, has now published a consultation document which 
considers the changes that would be desirable in light of the criticisms to their previous 
recommendations and seeks to ensure that the proposals are consistent with the international 
obligations of the UK, e.g. the COE Convention and the UN Convention. See Law Commission, 
Reforming Bribery. Consultation Paper 185 (2007). This Consultation Document seems to have 
responded to some of the concerns raised by the OECD in respect of Art I for instance by proposing a 
separate offence of bribing a foreign public official. 
51 S.1. of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 refers only to “corruptly give, or agrees to give or 
offers”. The UK position was that the concept of offer includes promise. 
52 The UK put forward the view that even though s.1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 does not 
specifically talk about offer of bribery through an intermediary s.1. does mention agent thus bringing 
within it the intermediary. S.1. in part reads: 
 If any person corruptly gives or agrees to give or offers any gift or consideration to 
any agent as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having after the 
passing of this Act done or forborne to do any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or 
business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to 
his principal’s affairs or business… 
 … 
 (2) … 
 (3)… 
53 Phase 2 Report, para 194. 
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own logic’.54 It is well known that English law is peculiar in its blend of common law and 
equity and partial codification of various areas of law through statutes such that the law on a 
specific area could be spread across these sources. To say that the English legal framework is 
uncertain and complex therefore goes against the grain of the functional equivalence approach 
recognised by the OECD in its Commentaries. 
Judging from its reports, one of the key aims of the WG is to strive towards 
homogeneity. This is supportable to a degree since without uniformity of interpretation we are 
not likely to achieve a global approach to fighting corruption. Against this backdrop there is 
not much room for the functional equivalence approach other than giving access to a variety 
of sources during the assessment process to gauge how the laws of the State work and to 
establish whether a State is OECD Convention compliant. If the aim is to achieve 
homogeneity, it may have been better for the OECD to adopt a convention that did not impart 
notions of flexibility through the endorsement of functional equivalence or built in flexibility.  
III. ARTICLE 5, NATIONAL SECURITY AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
As stated in the Introduction, international trade in some contexts can expose tensions 
between state interests, national security and established international law principles. The 
recent UK decision to stop the investigations into allegations of bribery to Saudi officials by 
British Aerospace Systems PLC (BAE) is one instance where Art 5 of the OECD Convention, 
state interests and national security have come under scrutiny. Article 5 states: 
Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall be subject to the 
applicable rules and principles of each Party. They shall not be influenced by considerations of 
national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the identity 
of the natural or legal persons involved.
54 Pieth, fn 24. 
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In 2004 the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) with the Ministry of Defence, initiated an 
investigation, under Part 12 of ATCSA, into ‘suspected false accounting’, in relation to deals 
for the supply of defence equipment to Saudi Arabia by BAE.55 The focus of the investigation 
was on allegations that BAE had been running a slush fund for the purpose of bribing Saudi 
Arabian officials.56
Amidst media reports that pressure was being applied by Saudi Arabia, BAE and even 
the British Government to halt the inquiry and concerns about possible loss of jobs and 
revenue if Saudi Arabia discontinued with the contracts for defence equipment,57 the SFO 
announced the discontinuation of the investigation on December 14, 2006 with the following 
press release: 
This decision has been taken following representations that have been made both to the 
Attorney General and the Director of the SFO concerning the need to safeguard national and 
international security. 
It has been necessary to balance the need to maintain rule of law against the wider 
public interest. 
No weight has been given to commercial interests or to the national economic interest.58
The SFO statement clearly emphasised that economic matters expressly restricted by Art 5 
had not been taken into account in deciding to end the inquiry. The extent to which such 
matters actually informed the decision was, at the time of writing, unresolved. Documents 
55 SFO Press Statement, 3 November 2004 at < http://www.sfo.gov.uk/news/prout/pr_337.asp?seltxt=>. 
The official published details concerning the investigation and subsequent decision are not 
comprehensive. The UK news media did, however, engaged in extensive reporting of the matter. 
56 Initial reports suggested that the fund was worth £60 million but it was later suggested that £1 billion 
had been ‘secretly shuffled through BAE’s accounts’ via two offshore accounts, the existence of which 
was not disclosed in BAE’s published accounts and that the Ministry of Defence had been directly 
involved in the administration of payments. See, for example, Leigh, D, ‘Secret flow of £1bn through 
accounts’ The Guardian, (London, December 15, 2006); O’Connell, D, ‘BAE cashes in on £40bn Arab 
jet deal’ The Times, (London, August 20, 2006); Pallister, D, ‘The arms deal they called the dove: how 
Britain grasped the biggest prize’ The Guardian, (London, December 15, 2006). See Leigh (2006), n. 
61 and Leigh, D. and R. Evans ‘MoD accused over role in Bandar’s £1bn’ The Guardian, (London, 
June 12, 2007). 
57 See, for example, Leigh, D. and R. Evans, ‘National interest halts arms corruption inquiry’, The
Guardian, (London, December 15, 2006); ‘Saudis piled pressure on Blair’, Financial Times, (London, 
December 15, 2006).  
58 SFO Press Statement, 14 December 2006 at <http://www/sfo.gov.uk/news/pout/pr_497.asp?seltxt=> 
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submitted for the judicial review proceedings should shed light on this area, though many 
documents may not be publicly available (under the Freedom of Information Act 2000), for 
several years.59 Nevertheless, the decision has attracted criticism, including accusations that 
the decision conflicts with the OECD Convention. 
Though the statement made clear that economic factors were not taken into account it 
was less so on the matter of ‘relations with another state’. Saudi Arabia had reportedly 
threatened to withdraw co-operation on matters including intelligence and security. In the 
House of Lords the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, stated that he had consulted the Prime 
Minister and other relevant figures, who had  
expressed the clear view that the continuation of the investigation would cause serious damage 
to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic co-operation, which is likely to have 
seriously negative consequences for the United Kingdom public interest in terms of both 
national security and our highest priority foreign policy objectives in the Middle East.60 61 
Any consideration of the effect on relations of these matters, particularly those not directly 
pertaining to national security, would appear to conflict with Art 5. The SFO statement 
however makes clear that security concerns were officially the basis of the decision and not 
59 Permission to bring a full judicial review hearing was granted by the High Court on 9 November 
2007. 
60 Hansard, HL, vol 687 col 1712, (14 December 2006), per The Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith?
61 The phrase ‘highest foreign policy objectives in the Middle East’ is unclear but presumably would 
include diplomatic co-operation on a number of Middle East issues such as the Palestinian issue, the 
Iraq issue and safeguarding the world supply of oil, a major concern for the international community.  
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relations with another state.62  Nevertheless, this ambiguity has led to criticism that such 
matters were improperly taken into account.63
To some extent, however, arguments that the national security decision was in reality 
based upon, or linked with, concerns about relations with another state and was not 
permissible on that basis, muddy the waters in respect of the permissibility of the national 
security decision. The issue remains of whether national and international security is itself a 
sufficient ground on which to end an investigation or prosecution. This is relevant not only to 
the current situation of the UK but also to the future application of the OECD Convention, 
given the current international political climate. 
It is this matter of national security which is of primary importance for present 
purposes. The first difficulty arises because Art 5 does not expressly refer to national (or 
international) security interests. This means that the compatibility of the UK’s decision with 
the Convention is unclear. It might be argued that it is implied that member countries can take 
decisions on the basis of national security. Lord Goldsmith has made comments to this effect 
subsequent to the decision: ‘I can’t believe that when we signed up we agreed to abandon any 
consideration of national security. It certainly doesn’t say that and I don’t believe that’s what 
we could have intended or any other country could have intended.’64 The simple counter-
argument, of course, is that no such consideration is implied.65 66 However, the reference in 
62 A related and important matter is the role of the Attorney-General (AG) and the relationship of the 
AG to the executive. That is, however, beyond the scope of the present argument. Recent media reports, 
referring to submissions made in the course of the judicial review process, have continued to assert that 
the Government, including the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, did exert pressure on the AG to end the 
investigation and that the AG believed initially that the investigation should proceed despite 
representations by ministers concerning the business and security interests at stake. It is also apparent, 
however, that the focus of the PM’s concerns was the risk to national and international security arising 
if Saudi Arabia acted on its threat to suspend co-operation. See R (on the application of Corner House 
Research and Campaign Against Arms Trade v The Director of the Serious Fraud Office, Index to 
Exhibit RW2 – Redacted Documents, CO/1567/07) 
63 See, for example, R (on the application of Corner House Research and Campaign Against the Arms 
Trade) v The Director of the Serious Fraud Office, Full statement of grounds for judicial review, Claim 
No. CO/1567/2007, available at: http://www.controlbae.org/background/JR_grounds.pdf. 
64  ‘Interview transcript, Lord Goldsmith’, Financial Times, 31/01/2007 at 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/04457f7c-b122-11db-b901-0000779e2340.html> 
65 See CAAT and Corner House, Full statement of grounds for judicial review, para 28, (n. 68). 
66 This will be primarily a matter of interpretation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
provides a starting point for the interpretation of Art 5 and provides that a treaty should be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms, in light of their context, 
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the official statement to balancing the rule of law against the wider public interest may 
suggest that the UK authorities contemplated that the decision was necessary even if it was 
contrary to the Convention. 
III.1. The Doctrine of Necessity and National Security  
Governed by the principle of pacta sund servanda,67 a State, in ratifying an international 
convention, agrees to meet its international legal obligations by complying with that 
convention. However, there are occasions in which States have violated their international 
obligations. The decision of the SFO possibly illustrates such a situation, assuming that the 
decision to end the investigation on national and international security grounds was contrary 
to Art 5. Where a State violates its international obligations, for example through non-
compliance with treaty obligations, it will usually attract responsibility for the wrongdoing 
under international law unless there are circumstances which preclude or excuse this 
responsibility.68 Reliance by a State on the doctrine of necessity indicates that the State has 
acted in such a way as to incur international responsibility based on wrongful acts, but that the 
wrongfulness is precluded because of the existence of a state of necessity. One question 
arising in this context from an international perspective is whether, in circumstances such as 
those arising from the BAE investigation, a State can invoke necessity as a defence when it 
violates its obligations under the OECD Convention. If this is the case then the decision of the 
UK might be justifiable even if it conflicts with Art 5. 
In order to address this question the availability of the defence of ‘necessity’ in 
international law, its meaning, and the conditions that need to be met for a successful plea, 
object and purpose and that subsequent agreement or practices in the application of the treaty as well as 
any relevant rules of international law, shall also be taken into account. (See section 31.) Since national 
security is not expressly referred to in the OECD Convention, considering the ordinary meaning of the 
provision may be of limited assistance but as has been noted, the UK authorities appear to consider 
their decision to have been made in good faith and in accordance with Art 5. Other principles of 
interpretation may also be relevant. Applying the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) for example, would indicate that were national 
security to be excluded then it would have been listed in the Article. 
67 Promises must be kept. 
68 See International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts (2001) 
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must be examined. There is no doubt that ‘necessity” is recognised in customary international 
law. The doctrine has a long history traceable to the writings of Grotius.69 Necessity was 
historically associated with self-preservation, as where a State in war time occupies neutral 
territory where the enemy State’s occupation of that neutral territory would pose a threat to its 
power or very existence. The twentieth century saw an expansion of the concept from 
safeguarding the existence of the state, to safeguarding an ‘essential interest’ of the state.70
Recent cases in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) also confirm that necessity as 
a defence to State responsibility for international wrongdoing can be invoked in relation to 
threats other than the threat to a State’s existence.71 In the Gab?ikova-Nagymoros72 case, the 
dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia arose out of a bilateral treaty for a joint project 
for building dams on the River Danube for the purposes of electricity generation, flood 
protection, and improved navigation. Hungary initially suspended and later abandoned its 
obligations under the treaty twelve years into the project, claiming grave ecological risks to 
the region as well as a threat to the water supply to Budapest. 73  Hungary relied on an 
ecological state of necessity for its failure to meet its obligations. The ICJ did not find any 
problems with invoking necessity on the basis of an ecological threat. 
69 Grotius H. De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, Libri Tres Bk II, Ch 1, para XII (Tr Campbell, A.C. (1901)) 
70 Ago explains that ‘even in cases of ‘necessity’, the concept of self-preservation can only be used to 
explain actions taken with a view to averting extreme danger threatening the very existence of the State, 
whereas, according to the opinion that predominates today, the concept of state necessity can be 
invoked above all to preclude wrongfulness of conduct adopted in certain conditions in order to protect 
an essential interest of the State, without its existence being in any way threatened’. Ago in ‘State 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts (part I). Principal works cited in the reports of Mr Ago. 
Document prepared by the Secretariat.’ Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission: 1980, Vol. II (1) U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD, 5-7 p17 para 8.  
71 In Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) I.C.J. Reports 1997 (25 September 1997,) the 
ICJ stated that  
[T]he state of necessity is a ground recognized by customary international law for precluding 
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation. 
 (para 51) 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. para 40. 
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This wider concept of necessity is now embodied in Art 2574 of the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC)75 Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts76 (Articles on 
State Responsibility) which states:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an 
act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:  
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril; and  
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.  
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if:  
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or  
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.77
74 Article 25 was formerly Art 33 and has been slightly revised. In Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros the state of 
necessity was evaluated in the light of the criteria laid down in Art 33 which provided: 
1.  A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act of that state not in conformity with an international obligation of 
the State unless: 
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest both the State 
against a grave an imminent peril; and  
(b) the act did not seriously impair an interest of the State towards which the 
obligation existed. 
2.    In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness: 
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity 
arises out of a peremptory norm of general international law, or 
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the state is not in conformity 
is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the possibility of 
invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obligation, or 
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity. 
75  This Commission was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 
(G.A>Res.174(II) of 21 November 1997. Its mandate is to encourage the codification of international 
law. One of its well known treaties is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
76 For an extensive commentary see Crawford, J. The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002). 
77 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, text adopted by the Commission at its 
fifty-third session, 2001. 
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The above raises a number of questions: (1) what is the meaning of the terms ‘essential 
interest’ and ‘grave and imminent peril’? (2) In what circumstances would a State be regarded 
as having no alternative but to breach international legal obligations to safeguard its essential 
interest? (3) How is the essential interest of the State in breach of its obligations to be 
balanced against the essential interests of other States or the international community? These 
questions are examined below and applied to the case of the UK’s actions concerning the 
BAE investigation and Art 5 of the OECD Convention. 
III.1.1. Meaning of ‘essential interest’ and ‘grave and imminent peril’ 
No definition of ‘essential interest’ in the context of Art 25 is provided within the Articles on 
State Responsibility. The drafters seem to have preferred to leave this undefined. The 
Commentary notes that what constitutes an essential interest will depend on the circumstances 
of the case and cannot be prejudged.78 However, in the Addendum to the Eighth Report on 
State Responsibility, by Robert Ago (the Ago Report), a few examples are given. According 
to the report, ‘essential interest’ could include ‘a grave danger to the existence of the State 
itself, its political or economic survival, the continued functioning of its essential services, the 
maintenance of internal peace, the survival of a sector of its population, the preservation of 
the environment of its territory or a part thereof, etc’.79  As noted above, in Gab?ikova-
Nagymoros the ICJ accepted that Hungary’s concerns for its natural environment related to an 
‘essential interest’ within the meaning of Art 33 (now Art 25).  
It is not that difficult to envisage situations that may be regarded as affecting 
‘essential interests’. For instance cyber attacks by hackers located in State X on all air traffic 
control systems located in State Y that renders them useless could be seen as an essential 
interest for enforcement authorities from Y to remotely access computers located in X without 
78 Commentaries, U.N. doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2), para 15. 
79 Ago, p 14, para 2.  
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going through the procedures laid down in the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
2001.80
The potential scope of ‘essential interests’ is broad and enables a State to avail itself 
of the doctrine of necessity in a greater range of circumstances than permitted by early 
interpretations of necessity. In this context there appears to be a strong argument to suggest 
that national security would be considered an essential interest of the State, in accordance 
with Art 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility. Safeguarding national security may be an 
aspect of several of the examples cited in the Ago Report, in addition to which the inclusion 
of the word ‘etc’ makes it clear that this is not an exhaustive list. The national security interest 
was, it seems clear, related to the threat of terrorism which constitutes a danger to the lives of 
citizens of both the domestic and international communities. 
It is not sufficient, however, that the State’s action related to an essential interest. 
There must also have been a threat of ‘grave and imminent peril’ in relation to that interest. 
Again, the matter of how ‘gravity’ is to be construed has been left open by the drafters. The 
Ago Report indicates that the threat must be ‘extremely grave, representing a present danger 
to the threatened interest’,81 though this perhaps sheds little additional light on the subject. 
The ICJ in Gab?ikovo-Nagymoros considered the matter in more detail and found that 
necessity could not exist without a peril duly established at the relevant point in time. The 
mere apprehension of peril would not suffice. With regard to imminence, it was considered 
that this was synonymous with ‘proximity’ or ‘immediacy’.82 Though the peril must have 
been a threat to the interest at the actual time [of the wrongful acts] this did not exclude the 
possibility that ‘a ‘peril’ appearing in the long term might be held to be ‘imminent’ as soon as 
it is established, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril, however far off 
it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable’.83 84 Thus, the court’s view was that 
80 Arts 31-34.   
81 Ibid., para 13 
82 Gab?ikovo-Nagymoros, para 54. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Hungary failed to satisfy the condition of ‘grave and imminent peril’. With respect to the planned 
works at Nagymoros the ICJ noted that though the dangers submitted were of a long-term and 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Ten Years On
31
imminence did not necessarily mean that the peril was occurring at the material time but 
rather that the existence of the peril must have been established at the time and that the 
realization of the peril was certain and inevitable, even if not occurring until a future point in 
time.
To fulfil this condition it must, therefore, be established that the action of the UK in 
ending the investigation was necessary to safeguard an essential interest of the UK, in this 
case safeguarding national security, including the lives of UK citizens, from a grave and 
imminent peril. It may be assumed that the primary peril in this case was the threat of terrorist 
activity.85 There is a strong case to argue that this threat would, for obvious reasons, be 
considered a grave peril. In particular, counter-terrorism intelligence provided by Saudi 
Arabia could be essential to protect UK citizens (and potentially the international community). 
With respect to imminence it can be argued that the peril was not merely apprehended. A 
large number of terrorist attacks had taken place worldwide in recent years and attacks had 
been carried out and uncovered in the UK in the six months preceding the decision.86 It 
appears that the peril was a threat to the essential interest at the time of the UK’s actions and 
that the withdrawal by Saudi Arabia of co-operation and communication on security matters 
could have established this peril as certain and imminent.  
unpredictable nature it could not be said that they were imminent. The dangers associated with the 
upstream reservoir were mainly associated with the extent to which the project operated at peak-time, 
which was the frame of operation originally envisaged in the agreement. The source of the peril 
downstream – deepening of the river bed – had also occurred in another capacity some years previously, 
thus the peril had materialised at that time and not as a consequence of the project. With regard to the 
Gab?ikovo sector the ICJ noted that a report produced by Hungary prior to their discontinuing their 
treaty obligations, did not express awareness of any “authenticated peril” whose realisation would be 
inevitable in the long term. (See paras 54-57). 
85 Clearly, detailed information about the actual degree of risk concerning possible withdrawal of co-
operation by Saudi Arabia and of possible risks associated with international terrorism is largely 
outside of the public domain and these comments assume that the threat was real and identifiable. The 
judicial review documents, Redacted Documents- CO/1567/07, presently provide most detail on this 
matter, from the perspective of the UK Government. It is apparent that the likelihood of Saudi Arabia 
acting on threats to withdraw co-operation on counter-terrorism matters and possibly also broader 
foreign policy initiatives related to the Middle East, were considered ‘imminent’ as of September 2006 
(see letter dated 29 September 2006, CO/1567/07). 
86 Four suicide bomb attacks had been carried out in London on 7 July 2005. A further four attempted 
bombings were reportedly planned for 21 July 2005 but were uncovered. Numerous other attacks have 
taken place worldwide. See, for example, BBC, Timeline of Al-Qaeda attacks,, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/3618762.stm>
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III.1.2. Identifying the ‘only means’ to safeguard an essential interest. 
It is clear from Art 25 that the action taken must have been the only way of safeguarding the 
essential interest from the imminent peril. This means that the conduct of the State which is 
not in conformity with its international obligations, ‘must truly be the only means available to 
it ... it must be impossible for the peril to be averted by any other means, even one which is 
much more onerous but which can be adopted without a breach of international obligations’.87
In Gab?ikovo-Nagymoros the court found that even if Hungary had been able to demonstrate 
a grave and imminent peril, there were other means which it could have applied in order to 
safeguard its interest. For instance, the peril corresponding to drinking water resulting from 
the lowering of the riverbed downstream of the Nagymaros dam could have been met through 
purification of the river water, rather than the abandonment of works, even though this would 
have been a much more costly process.88
It must be considered, therefore, whether the action taken by the UK, in ending an 
investigation on the grounds of national and international security, was the only means 
available to it to safeguard its essential interest, in the given circumstances. The limited 
availability of public information makes it more difficult to apply this condition. According to 
the Commentaries to the Articles on State Responsibility, means other than unilateral action 
are contemplated within this condition and paragraph 1(a) ‘is not limited to unilateral action 
but may also comprise other forms of conduct available through cooperative action with other 
States or through international organizations’.89 It appears to be expected that the UK had 
undertaken appropriate negotiations with Saudi Arabia concerning their continued co-
operation with regard to intelligence. The extent to which this option was exhausted cannot be 
commented on with any certainty though the citing of national security concerns as a reason 
to end the investigation might arguably imply that this was the case. In addition, the fact that 
87 Ago, p 20, para 4. 
88 Gab?ikovo-Nagymoros, para 55. 
89 Commentaries, para 15. 
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the investigation was pursued for two years does, it may be argued, shows some degree of 
commitment on the part of the UK, to exhausting other potential courses of action. 
It has also been suggested that had Saudi Arabia withdrawn diplomatic co-operation, 
it would have been in breach of its international obligations with respect to the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373/2001. 90  That UN resolutions are either binding or 
enforceable upon member states is contestable.91 However, the application for judicial review 
submitted on behalf of CAAT92 and Corner House93 contends that this resolution is binding. 
On this basis it might again be argued that there were alternative courses open to the UK, in 
this case through seeking to enforce Resolution 1373/2001 within the Security Council. In 
reality, even if the resolution were enforceable, the timescale likely to have been involved in 
such an action may prevent this from being considered a genuine alternative means, 
particularly if Saudi Arabia had withdrawn co-operation in the meantime, increasing the 
imminence of the identified peril. 
Finally, it may be argued that economic or trade sanctions could have been applied by 
the UK.94 According to UK Trade and Investment, ‘Saudi Arabia is the UK’s 23rd largest 
export market, with exports worth £1.676.2 bn in 2006. It is the UK’s largest trading partner 
in the Middle East and our second largest export market in the region after the UAE. The UK 
is Saudi Arabia's second largest foreign investor after the USA.’95 Although the UK stood to 
lose, economically, if the BAE contract did not go ahead, Saudi Arabia also had an economic 
90 See CAAT and Corner House, Full statement of grounds for judicial review, paras 29-34. 
91 See, for example, Castles, A. C. ‘Legal Status of U.N. Resolutions’ (1967) Adelaide Law Review,
3(1): 68-83.; Higgins, R. Problems and Process International Law and How We Use It (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1994); Amerasinghe, C. F. Principles of the Institutional Law of 
International Organisations (2nd ed. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2005). 
92 Campaign Against Arms Trade, an NGO working for ‘the reduction and ultimate abolition of the 
international arms trade, together with progressive demilitarisation’. More information available at 
<http://www.caat.org >. 
93 An NGO which ‘supports democratic and community movements for environmental and social 
justice’. More information available at <http://www.cornerhouse.org >. 
94  For more on sanctions see Elagab, O. Y. The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in 
International Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1988). 
95
<https://www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ukti/appmanager/ukti/countries?_nfls=false&_nfpb=true&_pageLa
bel=CountryType1&navigationPageId=/saudi_arabia> 
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interest in maintaining good trade relations with the UK. The extent to which this constituted 
a genuine option is highly debatable. 
III.1.3 Balancing the essential interests of the international community against the 
essential interests of the State in breach of its obligations  
The need to safeguard the UK’s essential interest regarding national and international security, 
including protecting the lives of UK citizens, must be balanced against possible essential 
interests of other States and the international community.96
Perhaps the most obvious interest of OECD Member States is in combating bribery in 
line with the objectives of the OECD Convention. This might be thought of as a primarily 
economic interest, but the wider impacts of bribery are well established. Thus, the need to 
prevent corruption corresponds to many aspects of a State’s ‘wellbeing’ and a threat to this 
interest may pose several risks. The UK’s decision to end the BAE investigation may be seen 
as impairing this interest because of the implications of a Member being seen to disregard its 
obligation to combat bribery. Most significantly, the commitment of other member parties to 
the Convention could be affected. Whilst the significance of this interest should not be 
overlooked, it is difficult to argue that it would outweigh the UK’s interest in the present 
circumstances, because of the immediacy of the threat to the UK. It seems arguable that the 
UK was in fact protecting an essential interest of the international community with respect to 
combating international terrorism through ensuring ongoing co-operation with Saudi Arabia. 
In conclusion, the issue of whether UK’s actions were compatible with the OECD 
Convention remains arguable. 97 It is ambiguous whether the UK did or did not take into 
account matters which are expressly restricted by Art 5. However, if national security is 
considered to be a prohibited consideration it appears that there is a strong argument to 
suggest that the UK could avail itself to the doctrine of necessity in order to ‘excuse’ its 
96 See also Ago, para 15. 
97 The OECD stated in March 2007 that it ‘it maintains its serious concerns as to whether the decision 
was consistent with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’. OECD: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_33873108_33873870_38251148_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
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wrongful actions. This is not an entirely satisfactory outcome. Effectively allowing the 
discontinuation of a bribery investigation because of the threat of action from another State 
leaves the international community in an uneasy position since it makes room for a state to 
disregard its treaty obligations on grounds of national interest. The potential for abuse clearly 
exists in such circumstances, through the exercise of threats by States in positions of higher 
‘bargaining power’. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has highlighted some emerging issues arising from the OECD Convention, both 
internal and external.  Some of these issues are internal to the convention created by lack of 
definition or ambiguities within the provisions and the application of the functional 
equivalence approach to diverse legal system.  Some may be regarded as external such as the 
interaction of the Convention with other established principles of international law. As argued, 
these issues may begin to take on new dimensions in the light of developments and trends in 
trade law, geopolitical shifts and emerging case law on the OECD Convention 
